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A B S T R A C T
The rise of modern digital communication technologies, most notably electronic social networks, transforms
structures through which consumers interact with one another. In this paper we distinguish between two
channels through which product promotion aﬀects sales. The direct channel always positively aﬀects consumers'
pre-purchase valuation. The indirect channel goes through word-of-mouth (WoM) and can be either positive or
negative. The sentiment contained in WoM is generated by the complex interaction process and depends on the
aggressiveness of the advertising campaign. We investigate the implications of the current changes in social
network architectures for the eﬀectiveness of the indirect channel. We show that changes in social structures
have increased the eﬃciency of WoM across a host of industries. Our results call for “smart” advertising policies.
1. Introduction
There is virtually no industry for which consumers' post-consump-
tion satisfaction is unimportant. Consumer experience gets commu-
nicated through various channels and aﬀects prospective sales of the
product. The raise of modern digital telecommunication technologies
has made the maintenance of large number of social contacts easier. As
a consequence, a modern individual maintains larger number of links to
the rest of the society. The shift of large part of communication from
oﬄine to online environments, which aids the proliferation of opinion
leaders, and where conversation records stay for longer period, has also
altered the conventional routs through which word-of-mouth circulates.
Such social changes, brought by advances in electronic social networks,
could potentially transform the economic system. The current paper
investigates the implications of these changes in social structures for the
link between advertising and sales.
Word-of-mouth (WoM hereafter) is particularly important in in-
dustries where consumers are not certain about the quality of the
product they are purchasing. This collects service and information
goods industries. In the case of the former, the quality of the service is
largely aﬀected by personal factors and, therefore, has large variance.
In the case of the latter, the nature of the product on sale cannot be
exhaustively veriﬁed. Examples of the industries in the ﬁrst group are
haircuts, taxi or other services. Examples of those in the second group
are motion pictures, books, software etc. In the case of the ﬁrst group
we deal with the repetitive purchases but information about the quality
is not easily elicited from previous experience due to the large variance
in quality of delivery. In the second case we deal with non-repetitive
purchases, therefore, eliciting the quality from the previous purchase is
impossible. In all of these industries consumers rely heavily on word-of-
mouth (Anderson, 1998; Godes and Mayzlin, 2004; Joshi and Musalem,
2012). There is an ample evidence that consumers in more conventional
industries like electronics and apparel are also heavily inﬂuenced by
WoM (Campbell, 2013). In fact, for a very large and diverse set of in-
dustries the information collected through interaction with other con-
sumers is the most reliable piece of knowledge shoppers base their
decisions on (Babutsidze, 2012).
Consumer satisfaction is believed to be particularly important for
repetitive purchases as consumers base their decisions on past experi-
ence. However, sales of any product are stretched over time. This gives
early adopters the opportunity to communicate their product reviews to
consumers who have not made their choice yet. In this vain, negative
experiences of early consumers might seriously damage producer's
prospects even in the case of non-repetitive purchases.
Besides prices, consumers' purchase decisions are also aﬀected by
other factors. Advertising is arguably the most important of those
(Nelson, 1974). Much like WoM, advertising is based on information
transfer. Unlike WoM, however, advertising is a purposeful action with
a clear aim to induce consumers to buy the product. In contrast, WoM
has no clear aim and it can either increase or decrease sales.
Advertising usually takes the guise of broadcasting and can reach
entire consumer population. On the other hand, WoM is decentralized
and circulates through social networks. As a consequence, social net-
work architectures will directly aﬀect the eﬃciency of WoM. Hence,
advertising is under direct control of producers, while WoM is user
generated. However, producers can still inﬂuence WoM. This can be
done, for example, by setting consumers' pre-purchase expectations
about the product. Let's simplify the product and discuss it as having
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just one attribute – quality. If consumer's pre-consumption quality ex-
pectation is lower than her post-consumption quality evaluation – WoM
generated by the consumer will be positive, and vice versa.
As a consequence, advertising is a double-edged sword. It can in-
crease sales by raising consumers' pre-purchase product valuation (a
direct channel). However, in the case of an aggressive advertising
campaign it can also hurt (an indirect channel). In this paper we present
a model of consumer behavior which allows for distinguishing these
two channels. We study the dependence of the indirect channel on the
topologies of the social network in order to evaluate the dangers of
over-advertising in modern WoM environments.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 covers the
prior literature, Section 3 introduces the model, Section 4 presents the
methodology we use to analyze the model, Section 5 reports the results,
Section 6 discusses the implications and concludes.
2. Literature
The main strand of literature that we build upon in this paper is the
collection of diﬀusion models (Bass, 1969). These models discuss a
monopolistic setup where a new product is introduced on the market
and consumers have to take a decision whether to buy the product or to
abstain from doing so. The diﬀusion setup has been fruitfully utilized to
study the interaction between advertising and WoM in related en-
vironments (Dodson and Muller, 1978; Nerlove and Arrow, 1962).
Positive feedbacks, which are generated here through word-of-
mouth, have been extensively studied in economics. The application
particularly relevant to the current work is that of monopolistic ﬁrm's
pricing behavior in presence of network eﬀects. This strand of literature
has had a recent surge (Fainmesser and Galeotti, 2016; Shin, 2017)
thanks to the increased attention to consumer-side network eﬀects
(Ajorlou et al., 2016; Crapis et al., 2016). Our paper leaves the pricing
question aside and concentrate on non-price-related factors.
Modeling advertising has a long tradition. It is usually seen as a
signal of quality as the literature suggests the positive correlation be-
tween the quality of the product and incentives to advertise (Milgrom
and Roberts, 1986). In this setup advertising is usually modeled as
being content-free (Nelson, 1974).1 In the current paper, advertising is
content-free and induces the rise of pre-purchase product valuation in
consumers. In order to avoid considerations concerning the optimal
advertising campaign (Nerlove and Arrow, 1962), that is out of scope of
this paper, we concentrate only on pre-release advertising.
A popular way to model WoM has been by using a random matching
process (Dodson and Muller, 1978). In this environment consumers are
randomly paired for interaction during every time period. Originally
the interaction was aimed at persuasion of the uninitiated consumers by
initiated ones. However, as the literature advanced, the possibility of
negative WoM was incorporated into matching models (Mahajan et al.,
1984). The implicit assumption in early models was that every con-
sumer participated in WoM. Recent work, however, has acknowledged
consumer heterogeneity in terms of willingness to engage in informa-
tion exchange (Campbell et al., 2017; Lobel et al., 2016). In this respect
a recent paper by Campbell (2013) is noteworthy. In the paper the
author allows for consumers who might not be motivated suﬃciently to
engage in WoM. This introduces the diﬀerence between two types of
networks – a social network and a WoM network. The latter is derived
from the former by removing unmotivated consumers. In Campbell's
setup WoM engagement status is constant over time: each shopper
belongs to the group of either active or non-active WoM consumers.
However, consumers' incentives with respect to WoM engagement
might change with time. For one, the act of consumption itself might
alter the willingness of a consumer to interact with peers. If a person
buys a laptop computer based on her quality expectations deduced from
the information gathered, she might want to continue participating in
information exchange in order to reﬁne her choice of the same product
in a couple of years. However, if a consumer sees a movie, she might not
stay engaged in WoM (about this particular movie) long after seeing it.
The ﬁrst example concerns the setup with repeated purchases. In this
case purchases will not aﬀect the WoM circulation network. The second
example concerns one-oﬀ purchases. In this case, purchases will erode
the infrastructure for communication among consumers (Dwyer, 2007).
This diﬀerence across groups of products could have signiﬁcant eﬀects
on the relationship between social network structure and product sales.
In order to account for this, we study two setups. In one the WoM
network is static. In the other it changes with sales.
Besides allowing for WoM disengagement, Campbell (2013) pushes
the literature in one more important way. Instead of modeling WoM
using a standard matching protocol, the author explicitly models WoM
on a social network. We follow the suit. We believe the random
matching does not describe the forces at play behind WoM with suﬃ-
cient granularity. This introduces diﬃculty as diﬀerent network
topologies might have starkly diﬀerent implications. In this paper, we
investigate two types of topologies that share properties with real-life
social networks – small world and scale free. Small world networks
have the features of high clustering and short path length between
consumers (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). Scale free networks also have
short path length, but instead of high clustering, they are characterized
by immensely popular individuals that serve as connectors among dif-
ferent parts of the social network (Barabasi and Albert, 1999). For the
sake of comparison, we add two other abstract topologies to this – a
regular lattice and a random network. Representing the two extremes of
the spectrum, these two topologies mostly serve as baselines for the
comparison of the results for small world and scale free structures.
Recent years have seen massive changes in social network archi-
tectures. The raise of modern telecommunication technologies and most
prominently of electronic social media have made social networks
denser (Donath and Boyd, 2004; Luarn et al., 2014; Sohn, 2009). There
has also been a shift of consumer interaction toward an online space
(Brown et al., 2007; Godes and Mayzlin, 2004). This has resulted in
social networks looking more like scale free topologies with highly
popular superstars (Backstrom et al., 2011; Bakshy et al., 2012; Ebel
et al., 2002), instead of small world networks that are predominant in
oﬄine environments (Dellarocas, 2003; Granovetter, 1973; Travers and
Milgram, 1969). The impact of these changes on the WoM eﬃciency,
and hence on the link between product promotion and sales has not
been studied as of today. This paper attempts to ﬁll this void.2
3. The model
3.1. Setup
The economy consists of constant number (I) of consumers (indexed
by i). A new product is placed on the market by a monopolistic pro-
ducer. We assume that the price of the product is relatively small, so
that the budget constraint is not binding.
The quality of the product is judged subjectively by each consumer.
Thus, the perception of the quality is consumer speciﬁc. We denote the
quality of the product as judged by consumer i with xi. We assume that
quality of the product is not known to a consumer prior to consumption.
The variable xi is randomly drown from distribution X. Realistically, X
is also unknown to the public.
Each consumer has an internal quality requirement yi for
1 Recent advances have discussed non-content-free advertising (Anand and Shachar,
2011) which is built on the premise of improving consumer-product matching.
2 There are other characteristics of social network topology that might also have an
eﬀect on the link between advertising and sales, like clustering (Katona et al., 2011).
However, given that it is not clear how and whether average clustering levels have
changes with the changes in social networks, we omit this characteristic from our dis-
cussions.
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considering buying the product. She purchases the product only if her
expectation for product's quality is no less than yi. Similar to the vari-
able xi, yi is drawn from distribution Y. The quality requirement is a
private piece of information, and thus Y is not known to the public.
At any point in time each consumer holds a belief about the quality
of the product – a valuation. We denote this belief by vit. The initial
distribution of beliefs across the population is denoted by Vo. Changes
in the valuation of each consumer as time progresses are incorporated
into vit∼Vt.
If there is no social interaction, we can calculate the expected sales
of a given product. This will be the expected share of the people for
whom initial belief about the quality of the product exceeds the quality
requirement. The value is given by
∫= ′z V (z)Y (z)dz.o (1)
To make the demonstration of the major ﬁndings feasible, in the
reminder of the paper we assume that our variables have more speciﬁc
distributions. In particular we assume that all three of our key variables
are drawn from normal distributions: X~N(μx;σx2), Y~N(μy;σy2) and
V0~N(μv;σv2). In this case the expected share of the consumers that will
buy the product is given by





































Eq. (2) is plotted on Fig. 1 for the case when σv2= σy2.3 On the
ordinate we measure the share of the population that is expected to buy
the product, while on abscissa we measure the average expected quality
(belief) of the product. As it can be seen, the higher (average) belief
about the quality of the product results in higher sales. Notice that due
to the fact that consumers do not interact, the actual quality (μx) of the
product does not aﬀect sales. On Fig. 1 we also identify the average
accepted quality in the population – μy. Quite intuitively, given that we
are working with symmetric distributions, when average expectation is
equal to average quality requirement – we can expect half of the society
to buy the product.
To simplify the exposition, in what follows we work with three types
of products. To deﬁne these products, consider a setup with no in-
formation uncertainty about the quality of the product, i.e. vi0= xi ∀ i.
In this setup we deﬁne a medium quality product as a product for which
μx= μy. This means that the product will be purchased by half of the
population. We denote the quality level of a medium quality product by
μxm.
Values of low and high quality products are denoted by μxl and μxh,
respectively. We deﬁne the low quality product as the one that will be
purchased only by 1/5 of the population and the high quality product as
the one that will be purchased by 4/5 of the population.4 Similar to the
deﬁnition of the medium quality product, both of these deﬁnitions
subsume no informational uncertainty. Combining these deﬁnitions
with the normality of X, Y and V0 distributions, and further assuming
σx2= σy2= σv2≡ σ2,it follows that μy− μxl = μxh− μy≈ 1.26σ. We
use this relation to calibrate the numerical analysis of the model. We
identify these three types of products on Fig. 1.
3.2. Dynamics
Now we introduce two central forces in our morel that can aﬀect
consumer decisions – advertising and word-of-mouth.
3.3. Advertising
Producers can advertise. We assume that producers can advertise
only before the product is placed on the market. Advertising increases
μv - the average expected quality of the product.5 However, it does not
make expectations more (or less) homogenous, thus it does not aﬀect
σv. This does not imply that variance across valuations stays strictly the
same after advertising, but rather that valuation now is drawn from a
new distribution with a higher mean, but the same variation coeﬃcient.
Although we do not model the costs of averting explicitly, we assume
that advertising is costly – all else being equal, driving μv to a higher
level requires more spending. From the Fig. 1 we can readily see that in
absence of consumer interaction higher advertising expenditures would
result into higher sales.
3.4. Word-of-mouth
To model consumer interaction, we assume that there exists a static
social network that speciﬁes the potential interaction structure among
consumers. Information about the product can stream through this so-
cial network. However, we consider the possibility of not every con-
sumer engaging in WoM during all periods.
Following Campbell (2013), we distinguish the social network from
the WoM network. We study two scenarios. One with the static WoM
network which is the same as the social network. This scenario best ﬁts
products with repeated purchases. In this environment consumers still
have incentive to engage in WoM and adapt their beliefs about the
product following the information they receive from their social con-
tacts.
The other scenario applies better to the environment with non-re-
peated purchases. In such a setting the consumer who has purchased
the product has not further incentive to adapt her beliefs as she knows
she will not have to make another choice about the same product
anymore. In this setup consumers leave the WoM network once they
have purchased the product. Thus, WoM network is dynamic. It departs
from social network with time. This setting is diﬀerent from Campbell
(2013) environment where despite the diﬀerent between WoM and
social networks, both of the networks are static.
Fig. 2 demonstrates the diﬀerence between the social and WoM
networks, as well as the diﬀerence between the setups with static and
Fig. 1. Benchmark sales in absence of consumer interaction.
3 Throughout the whole paper we consider the arrangement when σv2= σy2= σx2.
Hence, we ﬁx the variance coeﬃcients of the three distributions. Although the existence
of heterogeneity is crucial to the model, investigating the eﬀects of the degree of het-
erogeneity is outside the scope of this paper. Therefore, we do not manipulate the values
of standard deviations of three distributions. Rather, we put them to be all equal to each
other. Hence, eﬀectively we are left with setting only two parameters – the average
quality of the product μx and the average initial quality expectation μv.
4 Results are not sensitive to the deﬁnition of the high and low quality products. We
have experimented with alternative deﬁnitions (e.g. 1/4 and 3/4; 1/3 and 2/3).
Qualitatively the results are unchanged.
5 This is in line with ﬁndings by Elberse and Anand (2007), who report that that pre-
release advertising has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on expectations potential consumers
hold about the product.
Z. Babutsidze Technological Forecasting & Social Change 137 (2018) 27–39
29
dynamic WoM networks. Panel A presents an example of a social net-
work among four consumers. Panel B presents the corresponding WoM
network at two time periods across two regimes. In this example the
consumer C purchases the product at time t=0. This is denoted by the
node C turning grey in the subsequent (t=1) period. This introduces
the diﬀerence in WoM network across two scenarios. In the case of
dynamic WoM network the consumer stops participating in WoM and
thus information cannot stream through this node anymore. As con-
sumers are leaving the WoM network randomly, the dynamic WoM
scenario parallels the random attacks on networks studied by Albert
et al. (2000). With time the WoM network disintegrates into the ar-
chitecture that is hard to traverse. In this environment valuable in-
formation can get locked in remote parts of the social network and
leave substantial part of consumers un-informed.
In contrast, in case of static WoM network consumer stays engaged
in WoM and the information circulates on unaltered network archi-
tecture. In this setup the only constraint on information circulation is
the social network itself.
To formalize the consumer reaction to WoM, consider people pur-
chasing the product one by one (i.e. each time period only one person
can purchase the good). Consumer making a purchase at time t is
randomly selected from the people that are eligible.6 Eligibility is based
on two criteria. First, that this person has not already purchased the
product in any of the previous time periods. And second, that she is
willing to buy it (vit≥ yi). Once a person makes a purchase (we denote
such a time period with T), she realizes the actual (idiosyncratic)
quality of the product (xi). Thus his impression about the product at the
end of the period is
=v x .iT i (3)
After consumption, the consumer communicates viT to her friends,
who update their beliefs about the product according to
= + −− −v v b(v v ),jt jt 1 iT jt 1 (4)
where b∈ [0;1] is a measure of how much people trust the judgement
of their social contacts. We do not model b on a personal level. Rather
we assume that consumers are homogeneous in this respect. If b= 0 we
are in the setup with the “cheap talk.” In this environment WoM does
not aﬀect consumer beliefs, and hence the model dynamics in un-
changed. If, on the other hand, b= 1, consumers trust each other
completely and disregard their previous information.
After updating their beliefs according to (4), buyer's friends com-
municate their new beliefs further to their contacts. Down the line
people update their beliefs with
= + −− −v v b (v v ),kmt mt 1 nT mt 1 (5)
where consumer m receives the information from consumer n, and k is
the shortest path length between consumers n and m in the currently
functional WoM network. Modeling consumer interaction this way
implies that weight that consumers put on each other's judgements is
decreasing in social distance, as long as 0 < b < 1. This is reasonable
in light of empirical ﬁndings pointing to the constantly altering in-
formation streams through WoM communication (Kozinets et al.,
2010).
Notice that in our model consumers exchange information about the
perceived value of the product in question. This is distinct from in-
carnations of observational learning that constitute the basis for re-
vealed preferences. In case of observational learning the strength of the
neighbor's recommendation cannot be deciphered. As a result, mod-
eling of valence of WoM represents a challenge. In case of direct ex-
change of valuations among consumers the valence of WoM can be
directly modeled. This paper follows the latter tradition. The notion of
WoM valence is a cornerstone of much of work in consumer behavior in
marketing and psychology disciplines (e.g. Hess and Ring, 2016; Roy
and Naidoo, 2017). The distinction between observational learning and
learning that allows for the communication of richer information (i.e.
valuations) has been previously formalized as “showing” and “telling”
respectively (Babutsidze and Cowan, 2014).
4. Methodology
The consideration of the social network architecture makes the
model analytically intractable. Therefore, we resort to agent-based si-
mulations. Simulation methodology is as follows. At the onset, we
choose the environment – we set the values of model parameters. These
are values associated to three distributions (X, Y and V0),7 plus the level
of trust in the society (b) and the density of the social network. We also
Fig. 2. The relationship between the social and WoM networks.
6 The alternative here would have been to allow consumers with the highest valuation
to purchase the product ﬁrst. However, as we are only modeling a part of the decision-
making process, and various other aspects (i.e. availability of discretionary time and
budget) might also aﬀect the sequence of decision-making, such an assumption would
have been unjustiﬁed.
7 What matters for the results is the relation among these distributions, rather than
actual parameter values. In this respect we have three sets of parameters – three means
and three standard deviations. We can normalize the values of three means using one of
them as a denominator. For interpretation purposes we choose this to be μy.
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choose the nature of the WoM network (static or dynamic). We initiate
1000 consumers and randomly draw their characteristics (xi, yi and vi0)
from corresponding distributions. We also generate the corresponding
social network among our 1000 consumers. The network can be one of
four types: regular lattice, random, small world, or scale free.8
At t=0 we select consumers satisfying yi≤ vi0 (the set of eligible
consumers) and randomly draw one of them from this set. This is the
agent who consumes the product at t=0. She discovers xi and com-
municates this information to her friends. They update their beliefs
about the product quality according to (4) and communicate further so
that others update their information using (5). The chosen consumer
becomes ineligible for consumption in following periods. This con-
stitutes the end of period t=0 in case of static WoM network scenario.
However, in dynamic WoM network scenario, after the acts of con-
sumption and communication, the consumer (and all links associated
with her) is also removed from the WoM network. This routine repeats
at every consequent time period. Simulation stops when the set of eli-
gible consumers is empty.
Given that our initial conditions ﬁx only the distributions from
which actual values are drawn (and not the values themselves) – two
separate runs with same initial conditions will be (potentially) dif-
ferent. Therefore, in order not to allow random perturbations to skew
the results we employ a Monte Carlo strategy. Namely, for every
parameter setting we generate not one, but multiple (50) runs.
Ultimately we sweep the relevant parameter space and run the model
on 7560 diﬀerent parameter settings.9 This together with two in-
formation circulation network setups and 50 Monte Carlo iterations
gives us the total of 756,000 runs of the economy which constitute the
data for the analysis.
Ultimately our aim is to relate the parameters of the model to the
sales performance of the product. However, these relationships may be
diﬀerent across two WoM network settings. In order to see whether
there are actual diﬀerences in outcomes across two scenarios recall that
we have 7560 pairs of settings with 50 observations each. In other
words, every parameter setting in dynamic WoM network scenario has
its exact counterpart with static WoM network scenario, each of these
alters having 50 Monte Carlo iterations. Therefore, we conduct a simple
test of mean diﬀerence across the two corresponding sets of observa-
tions. Thus we can conduct 7560 tests. Statistically, if the two scenarios
were similar, the likelihood of a test to result into rejection of the null
hypothesis of mean equality is equal to 1 - level of conﬁdence. Namely,
if we are conducting a test with 90% conﬁdence, the same data gen-
eration process across two sets of data will result in rejection of null
hypothesis in 10% of the times. Therefore, if the static and dynamic
WoM scenarios were the same, the share of statistically diﬀerent means
across the two pairs has to be about 10%. However, in our 7560 tests
we can reject the mean equality in 27% of the cases. This implies that
dynamic and static WoM scenarios are indeed statistically diﬀerent.10
The breakdown of the test results across the distribution of main vari-
ables is given in the Appendix A. As one can see, there is only one
instance when the rate of rejection is close to 10%. That is for the 1st
quantile of the trust variable, which eﬀectively means when b=0. This
is intuitive as b=0 is the “cheap talk” scenario. In this setup consumers
ignore the information coming from their social contacts. Therefore,
WoM has absolutely no eﬀect on purchase decisions. Hence, diﬀerences
in information circulation networks are irrelevant and static and dy-
namic WoM scenarios constitute the same data generating process.
In order to draw general conclusions regarding the implications of
the model, we employ a regression analysis on the data generated from
agent-based simulations. This is necessary to distill the eﬀect of each
parameter we are interested in, while controlling for the eﬀect of all
other parameters. Estimation of the econometric models on the artiﬁ-
cial data produced by agent-based models is not usually a trivial issue
(Grazzini and Richiardi, 2014). Major problems arise with time-series
regressions because of open-endedness (and possible non-ergodicity) of
the collected data. However, current methodological contributions (i.e.
Guerini and Moneta, 2017) do contribute toward the popularization of
this approach (i.e. D'Andria and Savin, 2018). The current application
of Babutsudze and Valente (2018) is particularly close to the metho-
dology employed in this paper (including the out-of-sample prediction
power exercise described below). In the current paper, we run regres-
sions on the data from the ergodic state of the system. We do not in-
vestigate the time series describing the convergence to the equilibrium.
Therefore, there are no stationarity problems involved in our case.
As we want to see the relation between the model parameters and
equilibrium sales, which is a bounded variable (expressed in shares it is
bounded between zero and one), we have to run the generalized linear
regressions relating all model parameters to sales. However, as we are
dealing with the complex model (mostly due to the actual social net-
work being explicitly modeled), it is unclear, a priori, which of the
generalized linear shapes could describe the data the best. Therefore,
we perform a model evaluation exercise using out-of-sample prediction
power as a discriminant across the alternatives. We proceed as follows.
We take our 7560 scenarios and split them randomly in two parts:
80% of scenarios will be used to estimate the econometric model and
the remaining 20% will be used to evaluate the out-of-sample ﬁt of the
model. As the split between the two groups is random we are running
the risk of generating a spurious relationship if we do this just once.
Therefore, we bootstrap the process 100 times – for each of the models
evaluated we perform split- estimation-ﬁtting procedure 100 times and
average the results. After carrying out this exercise separately for static
and dynamic WoM networks, we have sales calculated from the actual
simulated data and predicted sales calculated from the estimated
econometric model. We use the average mean squared error (AMSE) as
the discriminant across the econometric models.
We contrast seven most popular generalized linear functions –
Linear, Logit, Probit, Log, Log complement, Log-log and Negative bi-
nomial. Table 1 presents the results. As one can see three of the models
(Logit, Probit and Log-log) signiﬁcantly outperform the other four al-
ternatives in case of the both types of WoM networks. Although the
diﬀerence is small across the three best performing models, the exercise
indicates the generalized linear regression with Logistic link function
best describes the artiﬁcial data in dynamic, as well as static WoM
environments. Thus, all the results presented in the following section
come from such regressions.11
5. Results
Our data comprises 7560 distinct scenarios. Some of these scenarios
are somewhat similar in terms of the environment. Others are quite
diﬀerent from one another. Our main concern is the impact of adver-
tising on sales. There are two channels through which advertising af-
fects sales. The ﬁrst is the direct channel: advertising raises people's pre-
purchase valuations of the product, and therefore more people pass the
threshold of minimum quality requirement and are eligible to purchase
the product. This channel is always positive. The second channel,
8 An algorithm for generating a regular lattice is straight forward. We use the algorithm
by Erdos and Renyi (1959) to generate random architectures, algorithm by Watts and
Strogatz (1998) for small world and algorithm by Barabasi and Albert (1999) for scale
free topologies.
9 As mentioned in previous section for the demonstration purposes we use only three
values of product quality (μx). We use ﬁve values for trust parameter
b∈ {0;0.25;0.5;0.75;1}. We investigate four types of networks. We use six values of
network density (average degree being 4, 12, 20, 40, 60 and 100). And we use 21 equally
spaced values for μv in range μv∈ (μy− 5σ;μy+ 5σ). 3× 5×4×6×21=7560.
10 However, whether this diﬀerence aﬀects the results qualitatively cannot be con-
cluded from this test.
11 The results are robust to the model choice across the three best alternatives. They
are qualitatively identical across the three best performing models in both WoM en-
vironments.
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however, goes through WoM. Advertising aﬀects the valence of the
sentiment contained in WoM and the latter, on its own, aﬀects con-
sumer's likelihood to purchase the product.
How can advertising aﬀect the sentiment contained in word-of-
mouth? Consider the producer that heavily advertises its product. So
much so, that the average expected quality is above the actual quality of
the product at t= 0. Then as consumers start purchasing the product,
expectations of majority of the people will not be met. This will induce
negative (compared to the average initial belief) WoM which, all else
equal, will decrease future consumers' likelihood of buying the product,
and thus hurt sales. However, if the producer advertises moderately, so
that the average expected quality at the onset of dynamics is below
actual (average) quality, then generated word-of-mouth will be positive
and will push the sales upward. Therefore, the indirect channel might
be positive or negative depending on the producers advertising level.
Before going into regressions demonstrating general results, we
present plots demonstrating some of the eﬀects present in the model.
Fig. 3 plots average sales across 50 Monte Carlo runs for few of the
model settings. Plots on both panels of the ﬁgure show the positive
relationship between advertising and sales. This conﬁrms the direct
chan- nel. The left panel on the ﬁgure demonstrates the eﬀect of in-
creasing trust in WoM in the society, while the right panel demonstrates
the eﬀect of increasing density of social network. Higher values of both,
trust and network density, have similar eﬀects: they help sales in low
advertising environments (left portion of each panel) and hurt them in
high advertising scenarios (right portion of each panel). This is due to
the indirect channel.
To demonstrate the presence of two channels statistically we switch
to regressions. The direct channel is straight forward as advertising
represents the parameter of the model and has to be included in the
regression as an explanatory variable. In order to accurately detect the
presence of the indirect channel in our data, we separate scenarios
when μv < μy and the ones when μv > μy. We refer to the former as
scenarios when producers “underadvertise” and to the latter as sce-
narios when producers “overadvertise”. Notice here that these refer-
ences are not completely accurate. In a sense that as we do not model
advertising costs we cannot talk about the optimal level of advertising.
Thus, underadvertising in our context does not mean to the advertising
Table 1
Statistical model evaluation.
Dynamic WoM network Static WoM network
Model Sales Predicted sales AMSE Sales Predicted sales AMSE
Logit 0.5704 0.5780 0.0123 0.5692 0.5762 0.0123
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Loglog 0.5704 0.5679 0.0125 0.5692 0.5660 0.0125
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Probit 0.5704 0.5785 0.0126 0.5692 0.5767 0.0126
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Log complement 0.5704 0.5647 0.0197 0.5692 0.5633 0.0197
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Linear 0.5704 0.5711 0.0225 0.5692 0.5697 0.0226
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Log 0.5704 0.5830 0.0359 0.5692 0.5815 0.0360
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
Negative binomial 0.5704 0.5831 0.0408 0.5692 0.5813 0.0409
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
Notes: Results obtained from out-of-sample prediction power of various models in synamic and static WoM settings. Sales are average sales calculated from the actual
synthetic data. Predicted sales are obtained from generalized linear regressions with various link functions (given by column “Model” in the table). AMSE gives the
average mean squared error between the respective sales and predicted sales.
Fig. 3. The eﬀects of trust and social network density.
Notes: The left panel depicts averages of Monte Carlo results for the low quality product with dynamic WoM and a sparse (average degree equal to 4) lattice as a
social network. The right panel depicts averages of Monte Carlo results for the low quality product with dynamic WoM, with medium size trust (b=0.5) and lattice
as a social network.
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levels below optimal one and consequently overadvertising does not
mean advertising levels above the optimal. Rather, with those terms we
refer to the comparison between consumers' initial expectations and the
(average) quality of the product.12
Thus, as we expect qualitatively diﬀerent response of sales to WoM
in cases of “underadvertising” compared to the cases of “over-
advertising”, in what follows we concentrate on results obtained with
regressions ran on collection scenarios that qualify for one of the two
groups.
Table 2 presents the results obtained from the regressions. The share
of consumers who have bought the product (sales) is the dependent
variable. Valuation in the list of independent variables refers to the
average initial expected quality μv, or how much consumers value the
product at the onset of the dynamics. This is the measure of the ad-
vertising eﬀort by the producer. Regressors also include two dummies
for high and low quality products. Scenarios with medium-quality
products serve as the baseline. The list of explanatory variables in-
cludes: trust in society (b), density of the social network and three
dummy variables to control for the eﬀects of varying network topology.
Given that our model is not calibrated with real data and that we
sweep a large parameter space with agent-based regressions, the actual
values of the regression coeﬃcients are less important. What are im-
portant are the signs of these coeﬃcients as we seek to draw qualitative
conclusions.13 Therefore, in the table we report only the signs of sta-
tistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. The complete report on the regression
results (i.e. coeﬃcients, standard errors, signiﬁcance levels) is pre-
sented in the Table 4 in the Appendix A. For reader's reference, in
Table 4 we also present the regression results on pulled data, which
collects observations from underadvertising and overadvertising sce-
narios, as well as the scenarios that do not qualify for any of the two
deﬁnitions (i.e. when μv= μy).
For each WoM network setting there are two separate scenarios: one
when producers overadvertise and the other when they underadvertise.
Firstly, it is obvious from the results that the product quality has a
pretty direct and straight forward eﬀect – better products sell better.
This is true in all scenarios except when consumers don't trust each
other at all (b= 0). In this case sales are governed by initial quality
expectations and the model behaves exactly as the model without in-
teraction as presented in Fig. 1.
The direct eﬀect of advertising on sales can be read from the coeﬃ-
cients for the variable “valuation”. Recall higher valuation (initial quality
expectation) is interpreted as higher advertising. As one can readily see,
in both types of regimes (over and underadvertising) higher advertising
results in higher sales, all else equal. This is the direct channel.
More interesting are the results for the indirect channel. We can
infer the behavior of the model in this respect by looking at coeﬃcients
for consumer trust in WoM and density of the social network. The
coeﬃcients are starkly diﬀerent across the two regimes in dynamic as
well as static WoM scenarios. In case of under advertising both higher
trust and higher density increase sales, while in case of overadvertising
the opposite is true.
In the case of underadvertising generated word-of-mouth is positive.
It is helping increasing sales. Higher consumer trust boosts sales be-
cause people are easily persuaded that the product is of a high quality.
On the other hand, denser network facilitates the positive word-of-
mouth reaching all corners of social network. On the contrary, the
WoM's persuasion power and its speed to traverse the social space is
hurtful for sales in case of overadvertising as in this case generated
WoM is negative.
We have identiﬁed two channels of inﬂuence from product pro-
motion to sales. The direct is always positive. However, the indirect
channel is initially positive, but turns into negative when advertising
reaches high levels. Hence, even though we are not modeling the ad-
vertising costs and therefore cannot identify the optimal level of ad-
vertising, we can still ask a question whether the negative eﬀect of the
second channel can dominate the positive eﬀect of the ﬁrst channel. For
this we have included valuation squared in the regression. As you can
see its coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant all four setups. This means
that the dependence of sales on valuation is concave. Thus, sales are
bound to start decreasing in advertising, if the campaign is aggressive”.
This means that returns on an extra dollar in advertising will turn ne-
gative (not simply less than one). This is eﬀectively due to the fact that
the indirect channel dominates the direct one, for suﬃciently high in-
tensity of advertising. Thus, the model points to the trap of over-
advertising in case of ignoring the eﬀects of the indirect channel.
5.1. Eﬀects of network topology
Because advertising in our model works as broadcasting – it reaches
(and aﬀects) every consumer – its eﬀect does not depend on the to-
pology of the social network. Direct channel of inﬂuence is therefore
Table 2
Regression results.
Dynamic WoM network Static WoM network
Underadvertise Overadvertise Underadvertise Overadvertise
Valuation + + + +
Valuation squared − − − −
High quality + + + +
Low quality − − − −
Trust + − + −
Density + − + −
Network controls Included Included Included Included
Number of observations 186,000 186,000 186,000 186,000
Notes: Reported results are the coeﬃcient signs from the generalized linear regression with Logistic link function and robust standard errors. All the coeﬃcients are
statistically signiﬁcant with 99% conﬁdence. Network controls include three (out of four possible) dummy variables corresponding to the network topology (random,
lattice, scale free and small world).
12 Notice that if product quality can be inferred from its appearance then higher ex-
pected product quality might be achieved with lower amounts of advertising. Therefore,
higher initial expected product quality implies higher advertising costs only in case of the
products of similar quality.
13 What are also important are the signiﬁcance levels of corresponding parameters.
However, given the agent-based modeling approach the level of signiﬁcance is somewhat
artiﬁcial. In principle, there can only be two outcomes – signiﬁcant or insigniﬁcant. By
generating suﬃciently large set of synthetic data any statistically signiﬁcant relationship
can be driven to 99% conﬁdence level (as standard errors shrink with increasing sample
size). Thus, highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in our regressions as reported in Tables 4 and 5
in the Appendix A are not surprising. An extensive bootstrapping exercise to generate
alternative standard errors from smaller samples generates very similar results: no single
statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in non-bootstrapped regressions is insigniﬁcant in
bootstrapped counterpart, and no single statistically insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient in non-
bootstrapped regressions is signiﬁcant in bootstrapped alternative.
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not aﬀected by network topology. However, word-of-mouth is gener-
ated through local interactions. As a result, its eﬀects are bound to
depend not only on the density of the social network but also its to-
pological structure. In principle, WoM eﬃciency might be very diﬀerent
across diﬀerent social network topologies.
Recall that we are comparing four network architectures to each
other: lattice, random, small world and scale free. Before going into the
statistical analysis, we present a graphical demonstration of the re-
lationship. Fig. 4 demonstrates the eﬀect of topology diﬀerence for a
limited number of settings. In this example it is clearly visible that for
high values of advertising, sales are the highest for the small world
network architecture and the lowest for the scale free topology. Recall
that high values of advertising imply an un-favorable WoM sentiment.
Therefore, in this particular example the scale free topology seems to be
more conducive for the WoM.
For the thorough investigation of the topological eﬀects we resort to
the regression analysis. In the runs presented in Table 2 we have in-
cluded only three out of four network dummy variables. For the sake of
controlling for the topology (in order to get eﬀects of model's other
settings) it clearly does not matter which of the three dummies were
included.
However, if we want to understand the diﬀerences across the
topologies we have to study the regressions coeﬃcients for network
dummies themselves. Clearly coeﬃcients of each of three included
dummies have to be read as the diﬀerential eﬀect from the baseline
(omitted) topology. Therefore, in any regression we can only judge
statistical diﬀerence between three included topologies vis-a-vis the
omitted one. We cannot say anything about statistical signiﬁcance of
the diﬀerence between any pairs of two included topologies. Therefore,
we estimate the same regressions as in Table 2 four diﬀerent times.
Each time one of the four topologies serves as the baseline and other
three are included in the regression. In Table 3 we present the regres-
sion results and concentrate on coeﬃcients of network dummies (all
other coeﬃcients are of course the same as presented in Table 2 and are
pulled in this table under “Controls”). In this table each box presents the
result of a single regression. We again concentrate on reporting the
signs of the statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. The full report is given
in the Table 5 in the Appendix A.
We ﬁnd that all four topologies are statistically signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from one another in both of the scenarios – when producers
overadvertise and when they underadvertise. This is true for settings
with static as well as dynamic WoM networks. Somewhat more
surprisingly, we detect a clear ranking among the four topologies in
terms of their eﬀectiveness in facilitating the link between advertising
and sales. Namely, the network eﬀectiveness increases as we go from
small worlds to regular lattice, further to random and to scale free
networks. This result does not depend on the nature of the WoM net-
work.
In order to understand the intuition behind the ranking note that,
there are two important factors at play here. One is the average shortest
path length within the WoM network. The other is the existence of
heavily connected individuals – opinion leaders. The interplay between
these two factors is complex. Opinion leaders can reach large masses
and directly inﬂuence them. Shorter path length also facilitates in-
formation diﬀusion. However, in essence, opinion leaders play an im-
portant additional role verifying the consistency of WoM across mul-
tiple closed neighborhoods. Without such opinion leaders contrasting
information can spread (at least locally) in remote neighborhoods.
Varying the number of highly connected individuals in the network
also varies other characteristics of the network, most importantly the
clustering coeﬃcient. Therefore, there is no clean methodology in this
framework to test our intuition about the moderating eﬀect of highly
connected individuals on path length in terms of information diﬀusion.
However, Appendix B does present the exercise that is fairly clean. We
follow the methodology of Cowan and Jonard (2007) and generate two
Fig. 4. The eﬀect of social network topology.
Notes: The ﬁgure depicts the averages of Monte Carlo results for the low quality
product with static WoM, medium level trust (b=0.5) and a sparse (average
degree equal to 12) social network.
Table 3
Regression results with respect to network topology.
Underadvertise Overadvertise Underadvertise Overadvertise
Random base base base base
Lattice - + - +
Scale free + - + -
Small World - + - +
Random + - + -
Lattice base base base base
Scale free + - + -
Small World - + - +
Random - + - +
Lattice - + - +
Scale free base base base base
Small World - + - +
Random + - + -
Lattice + - + -
Scale free + - + -
Small World base base base base
Controls included included included included
Dynamic WoM Network Static WoM Network
Notes: Reported results are the coeﬃcient signs from the generalized linear
regression with Logistic link function and robust standard errors. All the coef-
ﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant with 99% conﬁdence. Each box corresponds
to a separate regression. In each regression we omit one of the network dum-
mies and mark it in the table as “base”. Controls include all parameters of the
model, including valuation and valuation squared.
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sets of networks by varying rewiring probability in Watts and Strogatz
(1998) model. In the ﬁrst set the initial network is a regular lattice,
where every note has the same number of connections and therefore the
network does not have highly connected individuals. In the second set –
the initial network is a modiﬁcation of a regular lattice that allows for
opinion leaders (“stars” in language of Cowan and Jonard (2007)). The
exercise demonstrates the rate of increase in sales with the falling
average path length is higher under the network with opinion leaders
(i.e. “stars”), compared to the network without opinion leaders.14
As a result, we can conclude that without the presence of opinion
leaders shorter path length also facilitates diﬀusion of the “false”, or in
our case diﬀerent from mass WoM, information.15 As a result, in ab-
sence of highly connected individuals, shorter path length does not
necessarily result into higher WoM eﬀectiveness. This is the reason why
regular lattice ranks above small world architecture.
6. Discussion
The ﬁndings concerning the eﬀects of network density and topology
in previous section have an important implication. Our results imply
that changing social network architectures from sparse small worlds to
dense scale free structures has increased the eﬃciency of WoM. In
modern days a single overly negative review (which can be induced by
super-high pre-purchase expectations) can hurt product sales. With
time, the indirect channel gets to dominate the direct (positive) channel
for lower levels of advertising eﬀorts. Recent literature does indeed
point toward the large power of WoM (Hewett et al., 2015; Trusov
et al., 2009).
This insight does not depend on whether we use dynamic or static
WoM network. Even though have found that dynamic and static WoM
network scenarios are statistically diﬀerent,16 there is no qualitative
diﬀerences across the two. Thus, we can conclude that over-advertising
trap is universal and exists for wide range of products – products with
repetitive, as well as with non-repetitive purchases. This universal trend
has complicated product innovation processes for modern companies.
Today's companies cannot quietly try out their product on small scale in
order to elicit important feedback for perfecting them. Companies are
forced to look out remote geographical areas in order to carry out this
task (Economist, 2015). Some of the products are too hot even for a
great geographical distance. Even very powerful companies cannot pull
oﬀ bringing such products prematurely on the market, as demonstrated
by cases of Fire Phone (Amazon), Maps (Apple) or Google Glass
(Google).
This highlights the power of the negative WoM in our model. It is
well-documented that negative word-of-mouth has eﬀects of larger size
than its positive counterpart. A large number of studies have found that
negative WoM reduces perceived credibility of advertising as well as
brand attitudes and purchase intensions (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006;
Lou, 2007; Park and Lee, 2009; Singh, 1990; Smith and Vogt, 1995;
Yang and Mai, 2010). This points to the fact that the consumers have
asymmetric response to positive vs. negative sentiment contains in
WoM. However, this is not the mechanism that stands behind the power
of the negative WoM in our model. Here we do not allow for the dif-
ference in intensity of WoM depending on its valence. Eﬀectively there
is no ex ante diﬀerence in positive and negative WoM. This allows us to
shed light on a novel danger of the negative WoM: it is able to halt sales
at early stages of sales dynamics (by pushing everybody's valuations
below their respective thresholds) and shield the society from further
(possibly positive) information. Therefore, even though ex ante positive
and negative WoM are similar, ex post negative WoM is more powerful.
In this respect, our results highlight the increasing importance of the
well-known managerial advice to “underpromise and overdeliver”
(Dixon et al., 2010; Parasuraman et al., 1991). With the rise of elec-
tronic social media that empowers consumers together with marketers
(Ya et al., 2015), the danger of over-advertising trap is ever increasing.
As a result, our ﬁndings call for the “smart” advertising policies, which
would involve economizing on product promotion spending and riding
the wave of the positive word-of-mouth. There is indeed an empirical
support for the optimality of moderately-toned media strategy. Bolton
et al. (2006) has found such evidence in a standard communication
setting, while the recent study by Hewett et al. (2015) has reached a
similar conclusion in an online communication setting. Yet, judging
from the dynamics of the product quality expectations, which are
usually decreasing over time (Yong, 2006), a number of producers still
get into an over-advertising trap. Over-advertising ﬁrms fail in two
respects. Firstly, they waste their money on advertising. And secondly,
their campaigns turn WoM from the force that can help sales (positive)
into the one that ultimately hurts performance ﬁgures.
Besides, a strong performance of scale free architectures also points
to another way advertisers might want to make their eﬀorts “smart”.
This is by relying on star individuals for promoting the brand. The
transformation of social networks to scale free structures that are
dominated by highly connected individuals presents another opportu-
nity for advertisers to save on advertising costs by relying on these
opinion leaders. Many advertisers have already seizes the opportunity
by jumping into sponsoring YouTube stars or Twitter mavens.17
However, a caveat has to be pointed out here. Our model only
considers a monopolistic setup. In this setup producers are shielded
from the eﬀects of the competitors' advertising campaigns. Once we
include competition in the setup it might very well happen that ad-
vertising becomes an arms race. A moderately-toned advertising cam-
paign might not be an optimal response to competitor's product pro-
motion eﬀorts. In such environments strategic advantages of the direct
channel between averting and sales might well out-weight the costs of
the indirect channel identiﬁed in the paper.
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Fig. 5. The distributional breakdown of the diﬀerence in outcomes of scenarios with static and dynamic WoM networks across parameters of the model.
Notes: The height of the bars corresponds to the share of scenarios with statistically distinct outcomes at 90% level of conﬁdence.
Table 4
Complete report on regression in Table 2.
Dynamic WoM network Static WoM network
Pulled Underadvertise Overadvertise Pulled Underadvertise Overadvertise
Valuation 2.548*** 4.294*** 3.746*** 2.568*** 4.450*** 3.674***
(0.018) (0.050) (0.034) (0.019) (0.051) (0.034)
Valuation squared −0.054*** −0.105*** −0.079*** −0.055*** −0.109*** −0.078***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
High quality 2.030*** 1.723*** 2.961*** 2.079*** 1.734*** 3.014***
(0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
Low quality −1.109*** −2.633*** −1.527*** −1.122*** −2.622*** −1.537***
(0.004) (0.018) (0.005) (0.004) (0.018) (0.005)
Trust −0.961*** 2.233*** −3.533*** −0.977*** 2.199*** −3.533***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.008) (0.012) (0.015) (0.008)
Density −0.000 0.005*** −0.004*** −0.000 0.004*** −0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Network controls included included included included included included
Number of Observations 378,000 186,000 186,000 378,000 186,000 186,000
Notes: “Pulled” regressions are performed on the data combining under- and overadvertising scenarios, as well as the scenarios that do not fall under any of the two
deﬁnitions. They are not present in Table 2 in the text and are given here only for reader's reference. Reported results are the coeﬃcients from the generalized linear
regression with Logistic link function and robust standard errors. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance levels correspond to: * −90%
conﬁdence; ** −95% conﬁdence; *** −99% conﬁdence. Network controls include three (out of four possible) dummy variables corresponding to the network
topology (random, lattice, scale free and small world).
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Table 5
Complete report on regressions in Table 3.
Random
Lattice 0.054 *** - 0.083 *** 0.176 *** 0.049 *** - 0.119 *** 0.194 ***
Scale free - 0.022 *** 0.082 *** - 0.117 *** - 0.024 *** 0.061 *** - 0.104 ***
Small World 0.055 *** - 0.390 *** 0.444 *** 0.082 *** - 0.350 *** 0.471 ***
Random - 0.054 *** 0.083 *** - 0.176 *** - 0.049 *** 0.119 *** - 0.194 ***
Lattice
Scale free - 0.076 *** 0.165 *** - 0.293 *** - 0.073 *** 0.180 *** - 0.297 ***
Small World 0.001 - 0.307 *** 0.268 *** 0.032 *** - 0.231 *** 0.278 ***
Random 0.022 *** - 0.082 *** 0.117 *** 0.024 *** - 0.061 *** 0.104 ***
Lattice 0.076 *** - 0.165 *** 0.293 *** 0.073 *** - 0.180 *** 0.297 ***
Scale free
Small World 0.077 *** - 0.472 *** 0.561 *** 0.106 *** - 0.411 *** 0.575 ***
Random - 0.055 *** 0.390 *** - 0.444 *** - 0.082 *** 0.350 *** - 0.471 ***
Lattice - 0.001 0.307 *** - 0.268 *** - 0.032 *** 0.231 *** - 0.278 ***
Scale free - 0.077 *** 0.472 *** - 0.561 *** - 0.106 *** 0.411 *** - 0.575 ***
Small World



































Notes: “Pulled” regressions are performed on the data combining under- and overadvertising scenarios, as well as the scenarios that do not fall under any of the two
deﬁnitions. They are not present in Table 3 in the text and are given here only for reader's reference. Reported results are the coeﬃcients from the generalized linear
regression with Logistic link function and robust standard errors. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance levels correspond to: * −90%
conﬁdence; **−95% conﬁdence; ***−99% conﬁdence. Each box corresponds to a separate regression. In each regression we omit one of the network dummies and
mark it in the table as “base”. Controls include all parameters of the model, including valuation and valuation squared.
Appendix B
In order to pin down the eﬀect of highly connected individuals on eﬃciency of social networks we adapt the methodology from Cowan and
Jonard (2007). We compare two scenarios for generating networks using Watts and Strogatz (1998) methodology. One starts with the regular lattice
(1000 nodes being located on a circle and each node being connected to 7 nearest neighbors on each side, in total 14,000 links) and varies the
rewiring probability in order to generate networks with varying average shortest path length. The other has a diﬀerent starting network than a
regular lattice. Here we also start with the 1000 nodes located on the network. Then we randomly identify 100 stars and connect with 25 closest
neighbors on each side. This allocates 5000 links. Then we distribute 9000 remaining links across the remaining nodes (on average 5 links on each
side) to make the lattice as regular as possible. Then we vary the rewiring probability to generate diﬀerent networks
It is worth noting that across the two treatments (networks with stars and without stars) one needs to use diﬀerent values of rewiring probability
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in order to generate networks with comparable average shortest path lengths. Also note, that clustering coeﬃcients are diﬀerent across the networks
of comparable average shortest path length with stars and without stars.
Fig. 6 presents the results of this exercise for an under-advertising scenario of a medium quality product on two panels. Left panel concentrates on
static WoM networks, while the right panel illustrates the results for the dynamic WoM network. Results in both panels highlight the importance of
stars in eﬃciency of social network. No noticeable diﬀerence across the two panels also points to the fact that diﬀerence in clustering coeﬃcients















































Fig. 6. The diﬀerence in sales for small world networks with and without opinion leaders (“stars”) across static (left) and dynamic (right) WoM networks.
Notes: The graphs are generated for the medium quality product under the under-advertising scenario. Presented data are averages across 100 Monte Carlo si-
mulations. Each Monte Carlo simulation results in potentially (slightly) diﬀerent average shortest path length compared to other 99 simulations generated from the
same initial conditions. In these graphs average shortest path lengths are averaged across 100 simulations for plotting.
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